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If there was one thing I learned in quite a few years as a practitioner,
it was that the people in the front lines do not particularly appreciate being
lectured by armchair tacticians about how to conduct day-to-day diplomacy. The
lesson stuck. I would not presume to talk here about diplomatic tactics in detail,
except to say that in my opinion Ambassador Stevenson appears to be doing
precisely what has needed to be done, and is doing it brilliantly. As one who
has nagged in the past for his sort of approach, I am absolutely delighted.
But if the armchair tactician has no real role, there is a very important
one for the armchair strategist. I use the military terms deliberately to high-
light the difference. In the tactical areas information is scanty, pressures
are savage, and hardworking public officials need our loyal - if not quite
unquestioning - support in doing the republic's business under trying conditions.
In the strategic area, however, there is a never ending need for the planning,
the strategic vision, the historical connections which it would be inhuman to
expect in the required measure of the men in the foxholes.
Thus a private - or practically private - student of foreign policy can
2be emboldened to comment on the events in the United Nations with the hope of
illuminating them against a larger backdrop, and in any event to consider them
without ail of the constraints of official doctrime, for such instruction as that
freedorn may produce.
Rarely in its 16 year history have such dire and portentous things been
said about the United Nations. Our friends in the press have always enjoyed the
role of Cassandra.. But suddenly they have a lot of company. Only a few times
in the past has there been such profound contrast between the standard expressions
of hope and confidence in the United Nations, and the forebodings about the time
of troubles it is facing, and the United States along with it. There were
only a few times, but it is useful to remember that there were such times. It
would not hurt to lengthez our historical view sufficiently to recall at least
three other periods in the UN's short history when the odds all at once seemed
to lengthen, and all but a few chronic - or professional - optimists joined
the chorus of gloom.
One such time of trouble was the first "Morning After". 1946 was a down-
ward slide into disillusionment, and by mid-1947 the scales had, by and large,
dropped off a good many starry eyes. The attendant political pain was intense.
Another time of trouble was the unnerving period during the first half of 1950.
It began with the communist countries progressively leaving the UN, and culminated
in a war. There followed a period in which, among other things, the Soviet
3Union did its best to make an "un-person", in the Orwellian sense of the
Secretary General of the United Nations. For what historical consolation
it brings, the unilateral liquidation of Mr. Lie was even more comprehensive
than that of Mr. Hammarskj8ld. The third time of trouble was a more subtle one,
and the present omis perhaps most intelligibly seen as an extension of it.
For by the close of the 1955 General Assembly, attentive observers were
discerning clear signs of the end of American hegemony and the beginning of a
new political configuration in the organization . Stalin was dead for two years,
the Bandung Conference had given shape in and out of the United Nations to the
interests of 29 nations, and mutual nuclear deterrence was the preferred shape
of strategic planning on both sides. Indeed, five years ago this month the
United States Government was holding elaborate post-mortems on the general subject
of "Where has American leadership in the UN vanished to?" As of 1955 it was
fair to say that nothing would ever be quite the same again.
I have indulged in this backward look not because I underrate the new
problems - far from it - but because they are not all precisely new. Their roots
go deep into the past and, as always, the past has something to teach about the
present and the future. This awareness is not necessarily reassuring. But it
does mean that we are not entitled to act too surprised and shocaked by the more
recent unfolding of international political patterns that seem tc show up so vividly
in the United Nations. It also means that some of the more blatant nonsense
that is now being said about the UN has been said before, and with just as little
attention to fact and reality.
Having said that, certainly there is a staggering agenda of problems facing
American diplomacy in the United Nations. The problem, as always, exists on all
4levels from the pinnacle of broad national strategy to the trenches and redoubts
where tactics win or lose the battle. What is happening in the United Nations
is a problem not only for the diplomat on the ground and on the home desk, but
also for the planner and strategist who has only too infrequently succeeded in
integrating the United Nations sector with the rest of the national policy pattern.
Out of the multiple problems in this real% two aroas of prime concern stand
out: first, the almost tropical growth in political and parliamentary influence
of the Afro-Asian states; and second, the campaign by the Soviet bloc to reform
the United Nations in the Nlescovite image.
II
It has always been true that the United Nations diplomatic scene makes sense
only when it is explicitly related to events and forces external to the organiz-
ation itself. This is the familiar argument, immortalized by Sir Gladwyn Jebb,
that the UN is a mirror of the world around it and that if the reflection is
ugly the organization should not be blamed. I profoundly believe this to be true.
But against it there has always been the complaint by some of Sir Gladwyn's fellow
Europeans that the ratio between the United Nations and the outside world is far
from a simple one-to-one. This view, in its most critical form, has always
castigated the UN as an inciter to riot. According to its doctrine the United
Nations, because of its compostion and because of its inherent bias, distorts and
magnifies to intolerable proportions the colonial issues. On the other hand,
the arsonist argument has by no means prevailed in the United States or
Scandinavia or in many other areas. It is far more commonly held that United
5Nations attention and pressure, particularly in colonial relationships, is not
only right but actually improves situations which, if uncontrolled, would
produce even less acceptable resulis.
- - This issue is by no means a purely theoretical one. If it is true that the
Afro-Asian group is using its near-majority position in the United Nations
simply to stir up racial and political trouble in the Portugese colonies, and if
one were confident Portugal would act with farsighted and enlightened pre-
parations for self government, then we should reexamine our own premises. The
evidence is all to the contrary, and we can only conclude that while United
Nations debates may encourage unrest, the conditions for unrest were there first.
It may be that without the UN, the colonial powers might have hung on a little
longer in certain areas. ~ But it is unlikely that the basic contours of the
problem would be v different.
The revolutionary process that has taken place in the once-imperial world
to the south has left a legacy of colossal. problems about how the new nations
are to be brought into a durable and mutually satisfying relationship with the
established order as we know it. The categories of problems involved in the
transition to nationhood are familiar ones and some of them are covered elsewhere
on the program. Still, the political and diplomatic effects of the process are
intimately tied to the substance of the problems . Most of all, the diplomatic
task is bound up with the priorities assigned by the countries directly
concerned, as they - not we - view those priorities.
The countries we are speaking of all share in varying degree the qualities of
being non-European, non-white, politically neutralist, and anti-colonial. I
have cited the colonial problem. Many people give equal weight to the problem
of gross economic disparity between rich and poor nations. Until the gap
6begins to close, no stability is possible between the nations involved, or in
any diplomatic forum in which they interact. Unquestionably this issue is para-
mount, and American diplomacy in the UN has labored for many years to offset
our negative attitudes toward multilateral financing of economic development,
toward more predictable international commidity prices, and toward the problems
of foreign and absentee ownership of resources.
I myself give an equally high rank to the racial issue. If the behavioral
sciences have anything to say about contemparary diplomacy it is undoubtedly in
this realm of misunderstandings, attitudes and images, hostilities and
frustrations. At root, George Kennan is right about the domestic basis for
successful diplomacy. For so long as the United States tolerates racism at home,
that Jong will all our bridges to the black, brown and yellow nations be shaky
and poorly supported against stress.
The north-south revolution by its very nature poses the problems of
statehood itself - of evolving political forms, of relating to regions and in-
tegrating in other ways, and again, perhaps most irportantly, problems of
dignity and of the pride which representatives of new nations have displayed
abroad since the first American diplomatic agents refused to bend the knee to
foreign potentates.
Clearly, if there were no U14 these issuos of substance would be the vital
stuff of international politics in much of the world. Because there is a
United Nations, they come together there and in their totality add up to a new
political force which by its numbers and by its pivotal role in the east-west
competition confronts the Western powers with perhaps ito, central diplomatic
challenge.
The new arithmetic now comes into focus. The facts about it have become
7commonplace. From 10 at the San Francisco Conference, the Afro Asian bloc
has grown to 46 (and will soon increase again). From two African states south
of the Sahara, there are suddenly 20. Add Cuba, and, sometimes, Mexico, and
it comes to very close to a numerical majority. Add the Soviet bloc, grown
from 5 to 9, plus Yugoslavia, and only 9 more are needed to make up the crucial
and decisive two-thirds in the General Assembly. Another popular way to arrange
the numbers i;3 to add together all the underdeveloped countries, i.e. the Afro-
Asian group plus, more or less, Latin America. Without the Soviet bloc this
hypothetical majority already commands a two-thirds vote, and, with the Soviet
bloc added, has a clearly commanding position.
There have been no such exact combinations - yet. But these possible
combirations of voting strength furnish the concrete basis for much of the concern
about the future of the Western position in the UN. Actually, the numbers
cau be used to support any side of the argument. In the last General Assembly
scme votes tended to show that the worst had finally happened - if the worst
is a minority position for the United States. The neutralist call for a summit
meeting carried over United States opposition, 41 to 37. The American proposal
on Arab refugee relief only received 31 votes to 30 against and 15 abstaining -
the first time in memory that the United States had not carried its way on that
issue to which we contribute the lion's share financially - and then we lost,
1 to 47, in the final refugee resolution with the unacceptable reference to prop-
erty rights. The United States was in the minority in the vote on the Mexican
proposal to discourage states from using their territories or resources to inter-
fere in the Cuban civil war. It was in a tiny minority in a committee vote
on a crucial paragraph on the Cuban resolution. And we could not carry a
8proposal to finance the Congo operation even though it cut the share of the poorest
countries up to 75%. The measure carried only after the reduction was made 80C.
The same Assembly session, however, can demonstrate the opposite case,
Who in a pluralistic world could legitimately ask for more decisive support than
the US received in such votes as those.: 62 to 12 to reject Soviet disarmament
propaganda moves in the plenary session; 54 to 10 to require orderly rather than
spectacular debates on the B-47 incident; 53 to 24 to seat the Kasavubu dele-
gation; 81 to 9 to approve the 1961 budget to which the communist bloc objected
so vigorously; 61 to 27 for a proposal on Cuba that we could live with - far
more, incidentally, than we had much right to expect under the circumstances; and
83 to 11 in a Congo resolution calling for effective measures by the Secretary
General, in the midst of the Soviet attack upon him and on the office as
presently constituted.
A third set of voton is interesting because of its ambiguity. Here one comes
closer to the truth about the divergent interests within the Afro-Asian bloc
and the growing fluidity in alignments in general, reinforcing the impression
that the present may be a poor time for confident political prediction, whether
optimistic or pessimistic. The Afro Asians, alonp, still do not hold the
parliamentary whip-hand, even though east and west seek their support. In the
41-37 vote on their summit proposal the communists were among the 17 abstainers.
The Afro-Asian call for a United Nations referendum in Algeria received 40 votes
in favor, 40 against - a fascinating example of the close balance between the
forces involved. Time and again the bloc failed to get 2/3 or even a simple
majority on such proposals as breaking relations with the Union of South Africa,
giving priority to Angola, or adjourning debate on the Congo.
9Of course the numbers only tell part of the story. The case for pessimien
is incomplete without the slap administered to the United States by the Africans,
through the Nigerian delegate, in the matter of the proposed American aid
program for Africa. Opinions differ about this: was the American gesture
insufficiently followed up by concrete proposals? Was the Nigerian delegate
being excessively unkind to us for his own purposes? Or are all American
initiatives, however sincere, to be unavailing until the storm has spent
itself a good deal more? Here, the armchair strategist can only fall into the
traps of insufficient knowledge and Monday morning quarter-backing.
But once again the coin has two faces. It is widely believed that in
the crucially important Security Council vote in the early hours of February 21
supporting the UN operation in the Congo and authorizing the use of force, if
necessary, to prevent the occurence of civil war, the Soviet Union shifted at
virtually the last minute from expected opposition to abstention. The
resolution of course was sponsored by three Afro Asian states, and the episode
dramatized the dilemma facing both the Soviets and ourselves. For both powers
must balanco their diplomatic priorities, and each periodically has to balance
its books.
The private citizen can only applaud the important ways in which United
States policy has recently improved its posture with respect to the new
countries. I have mentioned Ambassador Stevenson's personal success. The
whole country stands in his debt for so effectively sensing and acting upon
American diplomacy's principal tactical deficiency in New York. But surely
planners and headquarters policy mna'ers should share credit for curing
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American policy of its most schizoid defect by planting our banner decisively
on the side of racial equality and rapid independence. American support for
United Nations inquiries into racial disorders in Angola had a remarkable
effect, at least in the short-run, on neutralist opinion. And in all fairness,
we should also recognize that an important threshold was crossed even earlier
when in March 1960 the United States agreed in the Security Council that South
Africa's apartheid policy involved the maintenance of international peace and
security and was a fit subjOct fequncil action.
III
One of the grounds for the Western pessimism about the future of the
United Nations stems from growing Europoa. irritation with the "irresponsible"
majorities that ride roughshod in areas that are traditionally no one else's
business6 General DeGaulle 's extraordiuari virulent attack on the United
Nations seemed to underscore increasing European disaffection. Some students
of 7eotern anity believe the United States must again face a choice between the
Western alliance and the will o' the wisp of African and Asian nationalism.
There are many today who will argue that the United Nations can only worsen
Weotern relationships while holding no promise whatever of winning the
ephermeral, unprofitable - even hopeless - popularity contest with the
Soviets in - or out - of the UN.
This line of reasoning involves several dangerous fallacies. First of
all, there is nothing: new about the European problem in the United Nations.
Some of our Western European allies distrusted and feared UN action, particularly
on colouial matters, long before the newer nations developed their present
11
political strength. Both before and after SuezUnited Nations majorities have
run against what some European nations conceived to be their vital interests,
as well as their right to privacy in colonial affairs. Without documenting
the analysis (which I have made elsewhere), I believe that the final passing
of the colonial issue in its present form will profoundly transform the
European-UN relationship, just as it will transform European-African relations
overall. The truth of this is demonstrated by the shadings among Western
Europeans on this issue discernible for some years past. The spectrum began
with those having least sympathy with the UN and allegedly most to lose from its
intervention in colonial matters France, Portugal and Belgium, with the added
French nostalgia for lost hegemony in League days. Kid-point was Britain, where
the parties were sharply divided on the United Nations-colonial issue, and Mr.
Macmillan's winds of change had rather long since been measured and quietly but
irrovocably yielded to. At the far end were countries such as the Netherlands -
which but for the West New Guinea issue would have been planning and acting even
more positively in the United Nations in such 2iolda as economic develop~ment -
and Italy, which looked across the Mediterranean in a frame of mind geared to
an entirely new and clearly non-colonial era.
The end of the colonial era in Africa will not end the problems for
Western diplomacy. It is predictable that they will be numerous and thorny.
But the sooner that day comes, the sooner the West, the United States and the
United Nations will, be relieved of a crippling incubus. One predictable
consequence will be the acceleration of the integrative process within lurope.
This in turn could lead to a vision some Europeans already hold when they
look to the future: a united Europe which once again can have a strong and
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constructive voice in the international forum.
From the standpoint of American strategy, another thing needs to be
said about Western alliance problems in the United Nations. The end of the
colonial problem in its present form will doubtless bring Western Europe and
America closer together in their policies toward other parts of the world.
There will be an appreciably greater community of interests around the globe
than there is today. But until that happens we cannot assume that it is possible
somehow to "solve" the problem of splits between America and its allies, in
and out of the UN, by applying to global issues the same coordinated strategic
planning and thinking that properly underlies alliance programs in the Worth
Atlantic area.
The NATO foreign ministers meeting at Oslo only recently registered
their determination to do just this. Surely closer consultations can only be
salutary. But it does not alter the central principle involved. The
raison d'etre for NATO is a common interest in that area, unquestionably
shared by its members. But at least at the present time there is an acute
divergence of interests elsewhere, a divergence that goes a great deal deeper
than lack of consultation. Common interests in the North Atlantic area
simply does not mean that interests are shared everywhere else. The French
make very different estimates than the American about what is at stake in
Southeast Asia; the British think us childish in our China policy while we
consider them naive; the Belgians consider us unsympathetic in the Congo and
we deem them unrealistically nostalgic; and the Portugese believe us to be
disloyal - as well as stupid - in Angola, while America reciprocates these
sentiments in equal measure.
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No single solution exists, in or out of the United Nations, to the
task of knitting together the western alliance. Diplomacy can lubricate the
points of friction, and in the end the Atlantic community, in divesting itself
of colonialism, will survive and flourish. But the tash of foreign policy
in the meantime is to manage a dual policy - alliance knitting, as well as
sustaining an independent American policy towards areas where we feel our
policies to be correct. The task of United States diplomats is made no.
easier by this duality. But no one ever pretended that diplomacy was easy.
How then, preferably with our European allies, if necessary without them,
can we work through UN diplomacy to contain the energetic and even unmanageable
forces of nationalism and social revolution sweeping across the globe and
coming into high relief in the UN? The substantive answers lie beyond the
scope of this paper. But the overall prescription is not a new one. If an
author can be pardoned for quoting himself, there is no, reason to amend
words written well over three years ago:
The success of the West in gathering support from these countries
has become increasingly dependent on the stands which Western nations
take on issues of primary importance to the peoples of that "third
world". These have not been such issues as capitalism vs. Communism,
or German unification, or liberation of the satellites, but colonialism,
"self-determination", economic development, and racial discrimination.
Out of the present membership of (99) approximately (63) members for
one reason or another see these as the crucial issues and put the
United States to the test in regard to them with increasing frequency.*
That this wad approvingly quoted in writing by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd persuades me
that we are far from alone in this insight. Undoubtedly the United States
* TeK and National Security", Foreign Affairs, July, 1958, p. 599 (figures
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could respond to the political requirements and serve its interests by
greatly intensified and positive UN programs in the areas of financing
economic development, technical assistance, human rights covenants, racial
problems and improved formulas for rapid yet cushioned independence. It
has become almost a clichd to call for such politics. But at the same time
there is danger in expecting too much of them.
For there is a special, refractory quality to this problem which sometimes
seems to render it impervious even to maximum efforts. The reason for this
is that the problem has an inherently intractable quality to it. We may have
the best will in the world - which I do not really doubt. We may even develop
a purposeful strategy and detailed policies to back it up - and here we still
have some distance to go in our foreign policy capability. But even so armed,
all kinds of disappointment and frustrations are bound to lie ahead. It is
going to take a long time to eradicate the traces of resentment, hatred,
envy, bitter memory and hurt pride which almost without exception linger in
the psyches of the new countries - more exactly, in their leaders. We must
learn to live with this, and to concentrate in the short term, the middle
term and the long term, on the promction of enduring relationships based on
common interests, shared enterprises and increasingly mature assumption of
responsibilities. If we can earn any popularity contests in the process,
tant mieu.
For the danger for the majority of the now countries is not that they
will go comunist. It is that they will not goy- period. To the extent that
the United nations is a place to engage them in common enterprises, to assist
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them in getting up momentum, to the extent that it supplies an educating sense
of involvement in the caugeOgont of international business, a rovealing exposure
to the problems of others, and a demonstration of the differences between the
styles of free countries and police states, and above all to the extent that
in our own domestic arrangements we set an example (and incidentally, learn
to become properly hospitable) to this extent the United Nations can be a
positive factor in American strategy during the difficult period that lies
ahead. To the extent we do none of these things, or do them badly, or half-
heartedly, or fall into the ancient trap of letting tactics become the master
of strategy instead of vice versa, to that extent our fears can be made to
come true. To that extent the United Nations can be transformed into a genuine
danger rather than what it is now, an opportunity to do some needful things,
and a test of. whether we are skillful enough to carry it off.
One of the foundation stones of American policy toward the new nations
is that they need us - our know-how, our money, our ideology of freedom.
But that is not the whole story 'We need them quite as much, and we need
them in and through the United Nations. The worse things become in the cold
war, the more need there is going to be for countries that are not affiliated
with either side. This is a compelling argument for keeping these countries
truly neutral. Diplomatic planning requires the cultivation and
availability of true neutrals who can play a multitude of roles in the peaceful
settlement of disputes and in healing breaches of peace. I am well aware
that this is precisely the contrary of the view being so vehemently advanced
by the Soviet Union. This brings me to the other great constellation of
issues - Soviet policy in the UN - which completes the triangle.
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IV
It is becoming difficult to pick up a newspaper without reading an
editorial alleging that the Soviet Union is seeking to destroy the United
Nations. The Soviet onslaught of 1960-61 has shaken us all. But it is not
entirely accurate to say that the Russians want to smash the United Nations.
It is not carping to ask for a more precise analysis of Soviet strategy, for
the difference between destruction and control is a crucial one. It can be
argued that the Soviet Union, on balance, is doing better in the United Nations
than ever before, and estimates her prospects for political profit in andthrough
the organization as increasingly promising. In this last session of the
Assembly, according to one record keeper, the Soviets received the largest
vote in history for a proposal they sponsored (29 in favor, with 53 in
opposition on a proposal to convene the Congolese parliament within 21 days).
Moscow has shown a renewed interest in Secretariat positions. In the case of
the International Atomic Energy Agency, Soviet interest in filling her quota
considerably antedates sane interest in tho UN. Most recently there
has been reportedly drastic improvement in the quality of the Soviet personnel
detailed to Secretariat slots. The improving Soviet position in the UN
suggests a more sophisticated cmplanatioi for recent Soviet moves to alter the
structure of the office of Secretary General than the rather 'simple-minded
one of blind destruction.
The present situation makes better sense when read against a broader
backdrop. In essence, the Soviet Union has now applied to the UN the same
principles of power and organization that :Iosc has applied to all
17
international institutions in recent years. Beginning roughly with the flight
of Sputnik I in October 1957, Soviet leadership has made no secret of its
revised assessment of the world equation of power and influence. The Strategic
reappraisal carried with it the policy consequence that diplomatic arrangements
henceforth should reflect the new equation. From that time on, the Soviets
have demanded "parity" in one international setting after another, and in
several important instances prior to demanding that the United Nations oust
Mr. Hammarskjald and convert the offZice of thet Secretary General into a
triumvirate representing the West, Communist bloc, and neutralists, and requiring
unanimity for action.
The UN Ad Joc Committee for Outer Space met for a year without the
Soviet represer.tative (and four others) because the composition negotiated in
the fall of 1958 did not satisfy the Russians. And its successor Committee
has made no h3adway because the principle - or rather, the successor principle -
of recognizi:ig Soviet leadership in the space field by making a Russian chairman
of the propcsed scientific conference has not been agreed to by the West.
The deadlon on the composition of the UN Disarmament Committee was broken
only by making it a committee of 99 members. Meanwhile the West had held its
nose -and r.ctually agreed to the principle of parity at the Foreign Ministers
meeting ir. the summer of 1959. Consequently the tentation Committee on
disarmament that met in Geneva in the spring of 1960, vainly as it turned out,
reflected a formula of five and five - a far cry from the three to one and
four to on negotiations among the foreign ministers since the war, and the
four to one United Nations disarmament subcommittee of the 1950s. Now the
Russians have asked for a five-five-five ratio, and one can guess that a
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compromise will be negotiated.
So the parity principle has been faithfully reflected in Soviet policy
for several years now since the time when it was discovered that, as the
Chinese Communists were fond of putting it, "the wind is blowing from the
east rather than from the west". But like so many trends, it took something
special to dramatize it. The Congo supplied the requiste drama as well as the
conclusive reason for the Soviets to demand theectension of the principle of
parity to the office of the Socretary General. The Secretary General had since
1955 been virtually an independent diplomatic power in the Middle East.
That process accelerated during and after the Suez crisis when the United
States, for one, was delighted to believe that important elements of policy
could be left to Mr. Hammarskj8ld. And perhaps the straw that broke the
Marxist back was not the Congo but Iaos in its earlier international incarnation
i.e. in 1959 when the Secretary General followed up the Security Council
subcommittee by himself sending and keeping on the scene a presence in the
form of successive high-ranking Secretariat officials.
By the interior logic of Soviet doctrino, as the Secretary General
became more and more of a political force in world politics in recent years
it was thus inevitable that the institution his office represented would require
revision to reflect the "realities" of world power. The matter then reached
a head in the Congo, where the Russians found they could no longer tolerate
the position of independent strength reached by Mr. Hammarskj8ld, enabling
him for the first time actually to thwart an important Soviet Union policy
objective. The death of Lumumba supplied the trigger, and a policy
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which undoubtedly reached deeply into ideological ucpths wa announced,
There is, of course, nothing remotely new in Mr. Khrushchev's recent
assertion to Walter Lippmann that, while there may be neutral countries,
there are no neutral men, and that he would never entrust the security of the
Soviet Union to any foreigner.* Mixim Litvinov used to say that only an angel
could be neutral and there were no angels, That the security of Russia,
whether Soviet or Communist, should be placed in the hands of someone else
has always been unthinkable. The historical- background thus places in a
rather more complex light the assertion that the Russians want to destroy
the UN. It also gives a more sophicticatod meaning to Mr. Khrushchev's
more recent statement that for the United Nations to be an effective medium
for settling international disputes, "treatment with very good medicine" must
be undergone so that it would not become a "weapon for imposing the will of
one state over another".** Finally, it means that American diplomacy faces the
task of a battle for control, which in many ways is harder than a defense of
the United Nations against its outright destruction.
The Soviets have never pretended to achiev- all their objectives at once.
In the years when the votes were 55 to 5 - a situation Americans would have
enormous difficulty in adjusting to under reversed circumstances - Soviet
representives manage2 to rationalize their defeats into victories, or at the
very least publicly pretended that it did not matter. In more recent years
* New York Herald Tribune, April 17, 1961
** Speech at Yerevan, Mday 6, 1961, New York Times , May 7, 1961
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departing Soviet representatives have tended to be downrighteuphoric. if the
campaign to convert the Secretarist does not succeed this year, next year
will do, or the next. Thus speaks a state with a plan, and in the state of
mind that Edmund Wilson once described as that of a man going upstairs on
an escalator.
The parliamentary ability of the United States to block the Soviet's
crude attempt to dump Mr. Hammarsjold and substitute a three-headed mollster
is not really in doubt. What is truly disturbing is the implication of this
campaign for situations in desperate need of nonpartisanship. It is indeed
discouraging that the Soviet doctrino of partisanship should become so emphatic
at a time when the world increasingly needs third parties in the form of
neutrals who can interpose themselves between belligerents, and men who can
be trusted by both sides. This development is going to make it increasingly
difficult to sustain the recent development of patterns of third-party inter-
ventions in issues depending on Soviet assent or cooperation. Undoubtedly
much thought is going into ways of living with this damaging and disheartening
situation.
It is possible, even likely, that compromise plans and arrangements will
be suggested, possibly as a follow-up to Mr. Nehru's abortive suggestions
last fall. It is possible that some formula for a'cabinet-type system, or
for elected deputies (reviving an earlier Dumbarton Oaks proposal) or for
magnified advisory committees, etc., will be adopted and prove tclerablo
Essentially reciprocal inspection, with perhaps some neutral nation
participation, may be the pattern for such limited arms control agreements as
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can be reached in the near future (which incidentally gives great urgency to
the need for rapid technological advance in robot sensing and monitoring
devices and systems). The nations themselves may have to revert to a more
active role in the investigation and observation of disputes and situation,
as under the League of Nations and indeed in the UN under the Lie administration.
But even with the greatest attempt to be reasonable and to acknowledge
in symbolic ways the changing realities of the international power order,
the underlying principle that is at stake cannot be compromised. Part of the
ethical and intellectual tradtion of the West is that men can be impartial
and fair-minded, evn as between nations. Such edifices of international
jurisprudence as have been built attest to that conviction. We mst, I
believe, stand absolutely firm on our refusal to submit to Khrushchev's
dictum that there are no neutral men. His assertion that this is true should
not be accepted any more than the late Mr . Dulles' equally unhelpful dictum
that neutralism was immoral. So long as parliamentary power still lies with
us and not with the Russians on precisely this sort of issue, we should guard
zealously our stewardship of this one precious advance out of the jungle in
international relatioc-, and actively nurture it at every opportunity in places
that do not require Soviet assent.
V
There are many other facets of the diplomatic problem in the United Nations
that ono might discuss if there were time and space. A word might particularly
be said about the ability - or inability - of the United Nations as a site
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for summit meetings. The performance in the early part of last fall was
superficially a tribute to the drawing power of uti ltilateral diplomacy. But
the spectacle of ten heads of state - including one king - thirteen prime
ministers, fifty seven foreign ministers, and some other fourteen cabinet
ministers of other rank - all present and competing for public attention,
holds obvious dangers for the United Nations, and for the kind of accomodations
between nations which, when one really gets down to it, is the goal of diplomacy
and the road to easement of international tension. I happen to believe that
the United Nations can be useful for summit diplomacy, if it is conducted
seriously, out of the public gaze, as in fact some of it was conducted this
fall in New York. The Security Council under Article 28 can hold periodic
meetings with high governmental figures present and can under its rules hold
closed sessions. Such a procedure can be invaluable when bilateral channels
break down and yet it1s important to keep decision makers in touch with one
another. But the danger of using the 99 merber Assembly for this delicate
task is obvious.
VI
There is nothing easy about America's diplomatic task in the United
Nations today. If wo used to be, as Dean Rusk liked to put it, the fat boy
in the canoe,. we have slimmed down considerably. Power has become diffused
and is likely to become more so. But the metaphor can be varied. To the
extent that political corpulence means satisfaction with the status quo, our
ultimate objective should be fat Russians, and eventually, fat Chinese. But
23
the road is a long one and so far they both wear, like Cassius, a lean and
hungry look. We can take some comfort from their disparate rate of maturity
and from their growing inner tension. One can take more than a little
satisfaction from the Soviet doctrine enunciated by Mr. Khrushchev on January 6
of this year that seems to rule out military solutions in the form of what he
called thormonuclear and limited wars.
But there is a large joker in the deck of peaceful coexistence, for the
same doctrine enthusiastically endorses communist manipulation of wars of
national liberation. For the United Nations this can only spell a continuous
budget of smbiguous, muddled, and otherwise sticky situations of civil war,
indirect aggression, guerrilla war, subversion and the like, all capable of
escalating into larger conflicts, and the treatment of which will require the
highest order of diplomatic skill whether bilaterally, regionally, or through
the United Aations.
The United States had the best of both worlds for a while. It enjoyed
the virtuous; sense that world order was in process, however slowly, along with
the comforttable conviction that it would be pretty much all our way, except
for a small handful of outlaws. Things are no longer so simple. Above all,
we cannot be sure whether the presently ominous portents and trends in the
United Nations scone represent a cycle - like so much else in history - or
a spiral, tal:.ng us to wholly newand unpredictable diplomatic, military, and
institutional places. For what comfort it brings, things have actually been
worse before, and everything is subject to change, including programs to impose
one system on cveryone else. The game is by no means over yet,
